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POINT I
PRESENTENCE MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW PLEAS OF GUILTY
ARE TO BE LIBERALLY GRANTED
The appellee correctly states that the standard of review in
this case is whether the Court has abused its discretion in denying
the appellant's presentence motion for withdrawal of his guilty
pleas.

The appellee then incorrectly cites a number of cases to

define an abuse of discretion. The cases cited by the appellee do
not define an abuse of discretion where the defendant has made a
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. In fact, a number of
the cases cited by the appellee have nothing to do with guilty
pleas at all.
In a number of cased cited by the appellee the defendant's
motion

to withdraw

a guilty plea was made during

or after

sentencing, not as in the instant case where the motion was made
prior to the court's imposition of sentence. State v. Gallegos 748
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987) is. a case where the issue was whether the
trial

court

abused

its discretion

in denying

presentence motion to withdraw a plea of guilty.

a

defendant's

In Gallegos the

court stated that in considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
the trial court is to determine whether the reasons offered for the
withdrawal "show a fair and just reason for granting leave to
withdraw the plea".

Id. at 1042.
2

The lesson of Gallecros is that a court abuses its discretion
in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea where the
defendant has shown fair and just reason.

In the instant case the

defendant has shown a fair and just reason why his plea was not
voluntary.

The defendants thought process was assaulted by

constant pressure from his attorney and then his family, to do what
he did not want to do.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT'S IN-COURT DEMEANOR DEMONSTRATES
THAT HIS PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY AND COERCED
The appellee cites a number of cases for the proposition that
this court should defer to the trial court's judgment.

The

appellee points out that the trial court had the opportunity to
observe the defendant's demeanor at the change of plea hearing. A
review of the transcript demonstrates that the defendant's plea of
guilty was not voluntary and was at most a momentary lapse of the
defendant's otherwise steadfast intention to cling by his plea of
not guilty and proceed to trial.
At the hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw plea of
guilty, the defendant testified that at the change of plea hearing
"his attorney poked him in the side and said, *Don, speak up and
make the judge think you really want to do this'11.

This testimony

of the defendant as to his uncertainty at the change of plea
hearing is made indisputable by the testimony offered by his
3

counsel. At the hearing the appellee called the defendant's former
counsel as a witness.

At this hearing the defendant's former

counsel testified that at the change of plea hearing
"(a) He had ^strongly urged' the appellant to
plead guilty, to the extent of poking Don with
his elbow in an attempt to get the appellant
to unequivocally plead. 1.-100,101; (b) The
appellant had always been hesitant to plead
guilty, even up to an hour before the hearing
was to convene. T-85; (c) The appellant had
often spoken of taking the case to trial.
T.94.
The testimony of the defendant's former counsel makes clear that
even as the defendant appeared before the court and told the court
that he understood his rights and decided to plead guilty, his
demeanor told another story. As the defendant had to be physically
coaxed by and (literally) elbowed in the stomach, his demeanor
belied the true involuntary nature of his plea.
POINT III
JUSTICE BEFORE ECONOMY
The appellant cites United States v. Stitzer. 785 F.2d 1506
(11th Cir. 1986) for a number of propositions, one of which is that
the trial court's decision should be affirmed in the name of
judicial economy. Stitzer. like the instant case, involved a trial
court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty.
the only similarity.

That is

In Stitzer. a number of defendants were on

trial for the inception and/or participation in a cocaine sales
4

network.

Once the trial had commenced, one of the defendants,

Baldwin, told his lawyer that he wished to negotiate a plea.
Baldwin's lawyer did two things; first, he notified the court of
his client's wish to enter a plea.

Secondly, Baldwin's attorney

informed the court of his own concern that Baldwin had been
threatened or coerced by one of the co-defendant's attorneys to
enter a plea.

At the change of plea hearing the trial judge was

concerned, due to Baldwin's counsel's belief that Baldwin had been
coerced.

To address this concern, the judge asked Baldwin several

pointed questions as to whether he had been threatened to enter a
plea by one of the attorneys. Each time Baldwin indicated that he
had not been threatened.

Baldwin's plea was accepted as voluntary

and the trial of the other defendants proceeded without Baldwin.
Baldwin then filed a presentence motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. The motion was denied. The appellate court's affirmation of
the trial court's denial of Baldwin's motion to withdraw a guilty
plea rests on two premises.

First, where there was concern that

Baldwin had been threatened, the trial court properly made repeated
inquiries to make certain that Baldwin's plea was not the result of
a threat.

Secondly, the court determined that re-trying Baldwin

would be a "prodigal" use of judicial resources.
There are a number of differences between Stitzer and the
instant case. Baldwin was repeatedly questioned to make certain he
5

was acting pursuant to his will.

In the instant case, the

defendant had to be physically prodded in order to respond to
questioning concerning the voluntariness of his plea. Despite the
defendants

apparent

reluctance,

the

court

made

no

further

inquiries.

In light of the fact that Baldwin's plea was made

during the trial, and as the trial went on for a month with the
remaining defendants, and as the court had found that Baldwin was
the central figure in the conspiracy, judicial economy may have
been an appropriate consideration.

While judicial economy may be

an appropriate consideration in some circumstances, it must never
overshadow a defendant's precious constitutional rights.
The Galleaos decision makes clear that in Utah, judicial
resources takes a backseat to a defendant's constitutional rights:
"The entry of a guilty plea involves the
waiver of several important constitutional
rights, including the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to
trial by jury, and the right to confront
witnesses. Because the entry of such a plea
constitutes such a waiver, and because the
prosection will generally be unable to show
that it will suffer any significant prejudice
if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence motion
to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general,
be liberally granted." Id. at 1042.
The Gallegos decision is consistent with decisions rendered by
courts of sister states.

For example, in State v. Johnson, 816

P.2d 364 (Idaho App. 1991), the court stated:

6

"...relief will be granted absent a strong
showing of prejudice by the state". Id. at
367.
State v. Dockery, 821 P.2d 188 (Ariz. App. 1991) where the court
stated that a withdrawal of the rule interpreting a withdrawal of
a guilty plea is to be:
"liberally interpreted, and doubts are to be
resolved in favor of allowing withdraw of
plea". Id. at 189.
Bigpond v. State, Okl.Cr., 463 P.2d 989 in which the court stated
"The law favors the trial of criminal cases on
the merits". Id. at 989.
State v. McAllister, 96 Mont. 348, 30 P.2d 821 in which the court
stated:
"If there is any doubt that the plea is not
voluntary, the doubt should be resolved in his
favor. On application to change of plea, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of a trial
on the merits."
POINT IV
DISTINCTIVE DIFFERENCES
There are other cases cited in appellee's brief that are so
different than the case at hand that they have no precedential
value.

Appellee contends that in State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738

(Utah 1985) "the court considered an argument similar to Thorup's"
(Appellee's Brief, p. 11). In Saunders, the defendant contended
that a 1977 conviction should not have been considered for the
purposes of determining whether the defendant was a habitual
7

criminal in a subsequent proceeding.

The court held that as all

procedural requirements were complied with in the 1977 proceeding,
there was a presumption that the defendant had understood what he
was doing when he pled guilty.

Unlike the instant case, the

defendant in Saunders never made a motion to withdraw his plea of
guilty.

The defendant in Saunders did not claim, as does the

defendant in the instant case, that the unrelenting pressure of his
attorney and his family deprived the defendant of his decision to
proceed to trial.
The appellee also claims that the case of United States v.
Nigro, 262 F.2d 783 (Ct. App. Third Cir. 1959) presents a similar
fact pattern as in the instant case. Not so. In Nigro, the trial
court, prior to a change of plea, had been apprised that the
defendant was entering his guilty pleas as a matter of convenience.
Prior to accepting Nigro's pleas, the trial judge asked additional
questions to make certain that Nigro had made a willful decision to
plead guilty. In the instant case, there was no heightened inquiry
despite the fact that the defendant's demeanor in court warranted
an additional inquiry.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant Don
Thorup's motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty. The defendant had
presented a fair and just reason why the pleas should have been
8

withdrawn.

The testimony of the defendant, his family, and his

former counsel (called as a witness by the appellee) verify the
intense pressure that was brought to bear against the defendant.
When his attorney could not convince the defendant to plead guilty,
he appealed to the defendant as a friend and religious leader.
Despite the defendant's protestations, former counsel persuaded the
defendant's family who then brought additional pressure against the
defendant. This pressure negated the defendant's ability to stand
by his decision to proceed to trial and allow a jury to determine
his innocence or guilty.
DATED this 21st day of September, 1992.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

By: H MA^

C^j^S>r^
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Attorneys for Appellant
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